A review of the TEAP Crypto-Binding code found a path that accepts a client without verifying any MAC. It was reproduced on the stable release 3.2.10 and reported, and the developers changed it to reject. In the development branch another check stops this path from being reached.
Predicting a configuration change before deploying itIn preparation
Whether a change to OWASP CRS settings will cause false positives or lose detection, known before it goes live. Prospective validation is in preparation.
WAF Rule WatchLive
Public rule updates from WAF vendors, and which actively exploited CVEs their texts name, tracked daily.
A CRI reference and its URI form could resolve to different addresses. 3 mismatches with RFC 3986 were shown with counterexamples and fixes, one fix proved in Lean 4. An author said they will be corrected before publication.
[1, ["", "a"]] against s://h/b/c§5.3 s://h/b//a§6.1 + 3986 s://h/a
CRI: check it by hand
Base s://h/b/c, reference [1, ["", "a"]]
§5.3 resolves the reference
s://h/b//a
§6.1 converts it to the URI reference /a, and RFC 3986 resolves that
s://h/a
One reference, two different results.
BGP path verification could mark a correct route Invalid. This was shown with a counterexample and a fix proved in Lean 4. An author said the algorithm will be revised.
correct route AS0, AS3, AS2-05 Invalidfix not Invalid
ASRA: check it by hand
Route AS0 → AS3 → AS2 → AS1
Up to a provider, across to a peer, down to a customer: no leak.
Only AS3 publishes: an ASPA, and an ASRA listing AS2 as a lateral peer.
AS0 and AS2 have no ASPA, so min_up_ramp = 1, min_down_ramp = 1, N = 3.
Step 4 checks i from (min_up_ramp + 1) to (N - min_down_ramp), so i = 2.
AS(2) = AS3 asserts that AS(3) = AS2 is a lateral peer.
-05 Invalidfix start at max_up_ramp + 1 = 3: nothing to check, not Invalid
A firmware condition for a final release also accepted its prereleases. This was shown with a counterexample checkable by hand. An author confirmed the error and is holding the next revision while a fix is reviewed; an exhaustive check and a Lean 4 proof support the proposed fix.
Equal [1,2,3] against 1.2.3-alpha.4draft matchesSemVer lower than 1.2.3
SUIT: check it by hand
§4.4.1 1.2.3-alpha.4 = [1,2,3,-3,4]
§4.4 comparison "stops after all integers in the array defined by the manifest have been consumed"
Equal [1,2,3] against 1.2.3-alpha.4
1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3, array consumed, stop
draft matchesSemVer §11 1.2.3-alpha.4 is lower than 1.2.3
Any organization member could invite users, without the required role, by naming a project from another organization. Reported; the developers fixed it and listed the report in their acknowledgements.
Problems have been reported to several projects and are being reviewed. They will be added here once fixed.
Open values in symmetric cryptography
Ascon: fewer active S-boxesPreprint
Lowered the best published active S-box counts we could find for NIST's lightweight standard. One pair of states follows all four rounds, and anyone can check it in a minute; 5 rounds have only a per-round check. Neither threatens the security of Ascon.
4 rounds
Designers
44
Best in 2022
43
This work
42
5 rounds
Designers
78
Best in 2022
72
This work
68
0active S-boxes80
Ascon: check it yourself
$ python3 verify/check.py
round 8: 15 active S-boxes
round 9: 11 active S-boxes
round 10: 9 active S-boxes
round 11: 7 active S-boxes
total: 42
matches the characteristic: True
Best published value we could find: 43. One pair of states, no dependencies, about a minute.