Public, source-linked measurement of disclosed breaches, exploited vulnerabilities and the state of public web defenses — Japan and worldwide, updated daily.
Daily editions · latest 3 Nov 2026, 23:30 JSTMonthly · edition 2026-10Newspaper · 3 Nov, issued 06:04 JST
Six update daily, one monthly. Each card shows the headline figure of its radar, computed from the same published data; the radar page has the tables, the sources and the method.
Cyber incidents disclosed by organisations in Japan: route of entry, whether it was exploited from outside, linked to the organisation's own notice where one exists.
7 days 79 · own notice linked 88 %
Incidents disclosed by US organisations through SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filings, HHS and state attorney-general notices.
7 days 31 · preceding 30 days 106
Attacker claims on ransomware leak sites worldwide (unverified), and how publicly released negotiations go: tactics, demands, discounts.
76 groups active · 39 victim-disclosed cases · preceding 30 days 958
New vulnerabilities ranked by exploitation: added to CISA KEV, likely to be exploited (EPSS), with severity, by product and vendor. Japanese.
7 days 12 · EPSS ≥ 0.9, 90 days 340
Public rule updates by WAF vendors, and which actively exploited CVEs their texts name. Listed in Awesome-WAF ↗.
17 of 112 exploited CVEs named by at least one vendor · 7 vendors active
Public reports on exploitation of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, and how many say an attack succeeded.
28 public reports from 27 publishers · 18 describe attempts only
Routing security (RPKI), TLS configuration, post-quantum readiness and hosting concentration of key Japanese websites — government, finance, infrastructure, municipalities, universities, companies — measured passively once a month. Japanese.
central government 100 % · post-quantum TLS: finance 74 %, government 90 % · 5,792 sites in 7 sectors
Daily cybersecurity news for corporate security teams, compiled every morning by an AI editor from public reporting, with a link to every source. English and Japanese.
Edition of 3 Nov 2026
Watch remotely managed devices and outside vendors
Pages: exploited vulnerabilities, incidents, threats and policy, from Japan and the world. Every item is labeled with its source.
Every figure comes from public disclosures, regulatory filings, vendor changelogs or public datasets. Nothing is collected from clients or private systems.
Each incident links to the organisation's own notice where one exists, otherwise to the report it was taken from.
Extraction is AI-assisted. Before publishing, every page passes an automated check of its shape, sources and forbidden content; a page that fails is not published and the previous edition stays. Items are not reviewed one by one — read the source.
Daily snapshots of every radar's data are kept on GitHub (CC BY 4.0), corrections included.
A research activity, not an institution: not a government agency, CERT or vendor.
ba-cybersecurity.com is the name under which Nobuo Otoi, a cybersecurity researcher in Tokyo, publishes research. The main line studies the defense of web applications: how web application firewalls produce false positives, and how to predict the effect of a configuration change before it is deployed.
A second line is measurement — of email authentication, of routing and TLS posture, and of disclosed incidents. The radars above are the automated, public part of that measurement line.
Other topics in preparation: security of LLM use in business, and cyber risk assessment methods. An open-source tool for predicting the impact of OWASP CRS configuration changes, with a pre-registered prospective validation, is in preparation.